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I I THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JESSE B. STONE, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY, A MUNICIPAL 
CORPORATION; J. BRACKEN LEE, 
JOE L. CHRISTENSEN, L. C. ROMNEY, 
T. I. GUERTS AND J. K. PIERCEY, ITS 
COMMISSIONERS; C H A M B E R OF 
COMMERCE OF SALT LAKE CITY, 
AND GUS P. BACKMAN, ITS SECRE-
TARY; ZIONS SECURITIES CORPO-
RATION, A CORPORATION; AND THE 
CORPORATION OF THE PRESIDENT 
OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST 
OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS, A CORPO-
RATION SOLE, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
RESPONDENTS' SUPPLEMENTAL 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Plaintiff JESSE B. STONE was not, on the 
date of the commencement of this action, and never has 
been, a member of the Chamber of Commerce of Salt 
Lake City. The affidavit of Gus P. Backman, dated 
March 9, 1960, attached to the motion of these respond-
ents to dismiss plaintiff's complaint, proves this fact. 
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2. The applicants, FAUSETT, were not on the 
date of their application to intervene, and never have 
been members of the Chamber of Commerce of Salt Lake 
City. The affidavit of Gus P. Backman, dated March 
30, 1960, proves this fact. Appellant does not controvert 
the same. 
ARGUMENT OF RESPONDENTS 
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF SALT LAKE CITY 
AND GUS P. BACKMAN, ITS SECRETARY 
POINT I. 
THE JUDGMENT DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION AND REFUSING TO 
ALLOW THE APPLICANTS, FAUSETT, TO INTER-
VENE THEREIN INSOFAR AS THE CHAMBER OF 
COMMERCE OF SALT LAKE CITY AND GUS P. 
BACKMAN, ITS SECRETARY, ARE CONCERNED, 
IS CORRECT FOR THE REASON THAT SAID 
PLAINTIFF NEVER HAS HAD ANY PRESENT 
SUBSTANTIAL INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT 
MATTER OF THE CONTROVERSY, NOR HAS HE 
EVER POSSESSED A LEGAL STATUS AUTHOR-
IZING HIM TO PROSECUTE SAID CAUSE OF 
ACTION. 
The defendant and respondent, Chamber of Com-
merce of Salt Lake City, is a corporation, organized and 
existing under the non-profit corporation laws of the 
State of Utah. According to its articles of incorporation, 
its principal purpose "shall be to promote the general 
welfare of the City and County of Salt Lake in the 
State of Utah; to engage and assist in social relief work 
therein and to carry on such other and related activities 
2 
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as are ordinary and normally engaged in by Chambers 
of Commerce." Gus P. Backman was at the time of the 
occurrence of the incidents related in plaintiff's com-
plaint and also at the time of the commencement of this 
action, the executive secretary of said Chamber of Com-
merce. It is apparent from the plaintiff's complaint that 
he was made a defendant in this action only because of 
the fact that he was the executive secretary of said cor-
poration. Therefore, it is proper to treat in this argu-
ment the Chamber of Commerce and Backman as a unit. 
The Chamber of Commerce has no stockholders; it 
only has members. The non-profit corporation laws of 
Utah contemplate such situation (Sees. 16-6-1, 16-6-12, 
Utah Code Ann. 1953). 
Eule 17 of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides 
in part as follows: 
"Every action shall be prosecuted in the name 
of the real party in interest*****/' 
The "real party in interest" is the party who by 
substantive law possesses the right sought to be enforced 
and not necessarily the persons who will ultimately bene-
fit from the recovery. Therefore, the question, who is 
the real party in interest, is governed by the substantive 
law. "The real party in interest'' provision applies to 
all suits including class actions (2 Barron and Holtzoff, 
Section 482, Page 5). 
"In considering the proper person to insti-
tute a judicial proceeding one should bear in mind 
the fundamental principle that courts are insti-
tuted to afford relief to persons whose rights 
have been invaded, or are threatened with inva-
3 
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sion, by the defendant's acts or conduct, and to 
give relief at the instance of such persons; a 
court may and properly should refuse to enter-
tain an action at the instance of one whose rights 
have not been invaded or infringed, as where he 
seeks to invoke a remedy in behalf of another wTho 
seeks no redress. One cannot rightfully invoke 
the jurisdiction of the court to enforce private 
rights or maintain a civil action for the enforce-
ment of such rights unless he has in an individual 
or representative capacity some real interest in 
the cause of action, or a legal or equitable right, 
title, or interest in the subject matter of the 
controversy. To enable one to maintain an action 
to enforce private rights, he must show that he 
has sustained some injury to his personal or 
property rights. The principle that one without 
pecuniary interest has no judicial standing runs 
throughout our jurisprudence, and unless one has 
some remedial interest he cannot be a party plain-
tiff. His interest must be a present, substantial 
interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy, 
or future, contingent interest, and he must show 
that he will be benefited by the relief granted." 
(39 Am. Jur . — Parties, Sec. 10, Pages 859, 860). 
Stone and the Faucetts have never been members of 
the Chamber of Commerce. With respect to this corpora-
tion they possess no substantive rights to vindicate in 
this action. When Stone named the Chamber of Com-
merce a party defendant in these proceedings, he was 
an interloper and was a meddler in matters which were 
none of his business. The Faucetts by their application 
to intervene, were also interlopers and meddlers. The 
actions of the Chamber of Commerce were none of their 
concern. The test as to whether Stone or the Faucetts 
4 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
were "real parties in interest" is: (1) whether they are 
owners of rights to be enforced; or (2) whether they 
are in a position to release and discharge the Chamber 
of Commerce from the liability upon which the action is 
grounded. (Regan vs. Dougherty, 40 N.M. 439, 62 Pac. 
(2d) 810). This rule is also well illustrated in the case 
of State ex. rel. Kays, et al vs. Wilson, 17 Wash. (2nd) 
670, 137 Pac. (2d) 105, where the Court wrote: 
"The order dismissing the action must be 
affirmed in conformity to the rule that to enable 
one to maintain a cause of action to enforce pri-
vate rights, he must show that he has some real 
interest in the cause of action." 
The Supreme Court of Utah in the case of Shaw vs. 
Jeppson, 121 Utah 155, 239 Pacific (2d) 745, clearly 
demonstrated exactly what is meant by a "real party 
in interest." In the course of its opinion it said: 
"The reason the defendant has the right to 
have a cause of action prosecuted by the real 
party in interest, is so that the judgment will 
preclude any action on the same demand by an-
other and permit the defendant to assert all de-
fenses or counterclaims available against the real 
owner of the cause." 
It is apparent in this instance that since neither 
Stone nor the Fausetts possess any interest in the 
Chamber of Commerce by way of membership to be 
protected or vindicated by this action, that a judgment 
in favor of the Chamber of Commerce in this action 
will not shield it against the claim of a real and true 
member of the corporation based on the facts alleged 
by Stone. 
5 
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The general rule is that the question of whether a 
corporation has acted in excess of its lawful powers can 
only be raised by one interested therein, or dealing with 
the corporation, or in a direct proceeding brought by 
the State authority to forfeit the charter or to subject 
it to punishment for the unlawful act (13 Am. Jur. — 
Corporations, Sec. 759, Page 790). One whose rights are 
not injuriously affected cannot complain that a corpora-
tion has acted in excess of its powers (Denver Power and 
Irrigation Company vs. Denver and Rio Grande Rail 
road Co., 30 Colo. 204, 69 Pac. 568, 60 LRA 383). A 
case very much in point is that of Jones vs. San Bernar-
dino Real Estate Board, et al, 168 Cal. Ap. (2d) 661, 
336 Pacific (2d) 606, wherein it was held that a non-
member of a real estate building board association, a 
non-profit corporation, cannot claim damages from the 
Association, nor could any liability in favor of the non-
member be imposed upon the Association. The illegal 
acts of the corporation cannot be attacked except by 
one whose rights have been invaded. {Belfast vs. Belfast 
Water Co., 98 Atlantic (Maine) 738,) L.R.A. 1917 B. 
908; Memphis and C. R. Co. vs. Grayson, 88 Ala. 572, 
7 South 122.; Burns vs. St. Paul City Raihvay Co., 101 
Minn. 263, 112 N.W. 412; New Orleans, etc. R. Company 
vs. Ellerman, 105 U.S. 166, 26 L. Ed. 1015; New England 
R. Co. vs. Central R. and Electric Co., 69 Conn. 56, 36 
Atlantic 1061.) 
The principles of law herein set forth demonstrate 
that neither Stone nor the Faucetts have any standing 
in Court to question the legality of the actions of the 
6 
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Chamber of Commerce or Backman, its executive secre-
tary, with respect to the acquisition by the United States 
of America of the site for the proposed new Federal 
Building. 
Appellant cites Rule 19, of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure as authority for the proposition that "persons 
having a joint interest shall be made parties and be 
joined on the same side as plaintiffs or defendants*****," 
and Appellant further quotes from Shields vs. Barron, 17 
Howard 130, 139, 15 L. Ed. 158, 161 to the effect that: 
"Persons who not only have an interest in 
the controversy but an interest of such a nature 
that a final decree cannot be made without either 
affecting that interest, or leaving the controversy 
in such a condition that its final termination may 
be wholly inconsistent with equity and good con-
science are indispensable parties." 
Appellant, therefore, concludes that "the Chamber 
of Commerce cannot be eliminated from the contract 
(sic) as there would be no one before the court with 
whom the City has a contract/' 
The fallacy of Appellant's argument that the Cham-
ber of Commerce and its executive secretary, Backman, 
are indispensable parties to this action lies in the as-
sumption that Stone and the Faucetts are in the legal 
position to litigate the validity of the actions of the 
Chamber of Commerce and Backman. Were they members 
in good standing of the Chamber of Commerce, this 
argument might have validity. Stone and the Faucetts 
are strangers to the Chamber of Commerce and their 
institution of this litigation against the Chamber of 
7 
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Commerce and its executive secretary, were gratuitous 
acts of interlopers. To state the matter in figurative 
language, Stone is a trespasser in the precincts of the 
Chamber of Commerce. The Judgment of the Trial Court 
evicted him. The Faucetts attempted to gain admission 
to these precincts but the Judgment of the trial court 
barred their entrance. Neither Stone nor the Faucetts 
are in a position to test the question, whether the Cham-
ber of Commerce and Backman are indispensable parties. 
Let a bona fide member of the Chamber of Commerce 
come forward and he may be able to reach this question, 
but Stone and the Faucetts cannot. 
There was no error in the Judgment of the trial 
court in dismissing Stone's first cause of action and re-
fusing to admit the Fausetts to the litigation. 
POINT II. 
THE APPLICANTS, FAUSETT, WERE NOT 
ENTITLED TO INTERVENE IN PLAINTIFF'S 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION INSOFAR AS IT IN-
VOLVED THE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF 
SALT LAKE CITY AND GUS P. BACKMAN, ITS 
SECRETARY, FOR THE REASON THAT SAID 
FAUSETTS NEVER HAVE HAD ANY PRESENT 
SUBSTANTIAL INTEREST IN THE CONTRO-
VERSY, NOR HAVE THEY EVER POSSESSED A 
LEGAL STATUS WHICH PERMITTED THEM TO 
INTERVENE. 
These Respondents have demonstrated under Point 
I. that the Fausetts were not entitled to intervene in 
this action and therefore the refusal of the trial court 
8 
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to consider their application to intervene was not error. 
No further argument is necessary in support of this 
point. 
POINT III. 
THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT IN 
DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S SECOND CAUSE OF 
ACTION AND REFUSING TO ALLOW THE APPLI-
CANTS, FAUSETT, TO INTERVENE THEREIN IN-
SOFAR AS THE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF 
SALT LAKE CITY AND GUS P. BACKMAN, ITS 
SECRETARY, ARE CONCERNED, WAS CORRECT 
FOR THE REASON THAT SAID DEFENDANTS 
AND RESPONDENTS NEVER HAVE BEEN CON-
NECTED IN ANY RESPECT WITH THE SUBJECT 
OF THE CONTROVERSY. 
The allegations of plaintiff's second cause of action 
will be searched in vain for any mention of the Chamber 
of Commerce of Salt Lake City and of its executive 
secretary, Backman. The reason for the silence of plain-
tiff as to the Chamber of Commerce of Salt Lake City 
and Backman, its executive secretary, is the fact that 
neither of them was in any respect connected with the 
alleged transaction concerning the Forest Dale Golf 
Course to which this cause of action relates. Insofar as 
these defendants are concerned, this cause of action 
should have been striken. They were never connected 
with the subject of the controversy and plaintiff does 
not pretend that they had any part in it. There was 
certainly no error in the judgment of the court which 
dismissed this cause of action as to these respondents. 
9 
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WHEREFORE, these Respondents respectfully sub-
mit that the judgment, as the same affects them, should 
be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
FRED L. FINLINSON, 
FRANKLIN RITER, 
Suite 822 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Respondents, 
Chamber of Commerce of 
Salt Lake City and Grus P. 
Backman, its Secretary 
10 
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